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SANCTIONING ATTORNEYS FOR
DISCOVERY ABUSE-THE RECENT
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: VIEWS FROM
THE BENCH AND BARt
FOREWORD
PAUL A. BATISTA*
The role of financial sanctions on attorneys in the federal dis-
covery process is no longer a parochial concern limited to the
members of the legal community. It has in recent months come to
the attention of the press, transforming the scope of the lawyer's
responsibility for the conduct of pretrial discovery into a matter of
public debate and consideration.
When the United States Judicial Conference announced in
September 1982 extensive proposals for amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, The New York Times1 featured a
front page article highlighting those proposals which mandated the
imposition of monetary sanctions on lawyers.2 No other aspect of
t This Symposium is adapted from a panel discussion sponsored by the Association of
the Bar, City of New York, on December 6, 1982. The moderator of the discussion was Paul
A. Batista, and the panel consisted of Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Peter M. Fishbein, and
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.
* B.A., Bowdoin College, 1970; J.D., Cornell University, 1974. The author is presently
associated with the New York law firm of Golenbock & Barell.
1 N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
2 Id. at B6, col. 6. In June 1981, the Commission on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed a set of amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc., U.S. JUD. CoNF., Preliminary
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the conference's proposals was treated similarly. This virtually un-
precedented attention appears to be the result of the growing pub-
lic perception that lawyers are the primary, if not the exclusive,
obstacle to judicial economy. 3 This perception appears to be
grounded in the notion that lawyers are inefficient and unduly ex-
pensive. Thus, the discipline of lawyers through money sanctions is
regarded as one way to bridle this inefficiency. In fact, the Advi-
sory Committee to the Judicial Conference of the United States
acknowledged this perception when it stated that "[c]oncern about
discovery abuse has led to widespread recognition that there is a
need for more aggressive judicial control and supervision."' This
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments]. These proposals
were amended and adopted by the United States Judicial Conference in September 1982.
U.S. Jun. CONF., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1982)
[hereinafter cited as PROPOSED AMENDMENTS], reported in Nat'l L.J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 13,
col. 3, and N.Y.L.J. Sept. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
3 See Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Pro-
cess, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 619, 619 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sanctions Imposed]. To a
large extent, attorneys are responsible for the present congestion and delay in the courts. Id.
Attorney abuse of the judicial process takes various forms, including tardiness, absence and
unpreparedness at pretrial conferences or hearings. Id. Perhaps the most criticized misuse of
time and resources, however, lies in the abuse of discovery. See infra note 17. Attorneys
both resist justified discovery requests, Krupp, Rule 37: Sanctions for Discovery Resistance,
7 LMGATION 32, 32 (Spring 1981), and make demands that are unfounded or excessive,
Note, Excessive Discovery in Federal and Illinois Courts: A Tool of Harassment and De-
lay?, 11 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 807, 808-09 (1980). -The abuse of discovery often results in exorbi-
tant costs to litigants, and in unfair settlements when the opposing litigant cannot afford to
undergo extensive pretrial preparation. See infra note 17.
' Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 483, Rule 26(g) advi-
sory committee note. Greater judicial supervision over the discovery process is frequently
cited as a solution to the problem of discovery abuse. Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and
Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 221 (1978); Note, supra note 3, at 824 & n.89. Justice Powell, an
ardent advocate of reform in the area of discovery abuse, has emphasized that "there is a
pressing need for judicial supervision [by the district courts] in this area." ACF Indus., Inc.
v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
The Supreme Court, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), stated that "the district
courts should not neglect their power to restrict discovery where 'justice requires [protection
for] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense.' . . .[J]udges should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery
process." Id. at 177 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). Judicial involvement may serve to in-
crease the efficiency of the pretrial preparation period. Suggestions regarding the form judi-
cial involvement should take include, for example, greater use of the discovery conference.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f); Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Ad-
versary Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to
the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 625, 664-67 (1982). Some commentators
suggest an increase in the use of protective orders. E.g., American College of Trial Lawyers,
Recommendations on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 224
[Vol. 57:671
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exhortation for more active judicial supervision of discovery abuse
evinces a firm position on the part of the Advisory Committee.
The old federal discovery rules create an inevitable tension in
the lawyer's role.5 Rule 26, characterized as "one of the most sig-
nificant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," per-
mits lawyers to obtain discovery of all relevant, nonprivileged in-
formation in preparation for trial.7 There is no need to emphasize
(1981). See generally Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Dis-
covery Sanctions, 91 HAv. L. REv. 1033, 1036-37 (1978). Imposition of discovery sanctions
has also been recommended. See J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338,
359 (D. Conn. 1981) ("just and reasonable sanctions is one of the established techniques
which a trial court may use to achieve the end of speedy justice"). Failures by attorneys to
comply with discovery rules work an injustice on the court system, as well as on the oppos-
ing party. In order to "[vindicate] the public interest," the sanctions "are an appropriate
means of deterring further violations ..... Id. at 360.
For similar viewpoints regarding judicial involvement as a solution to the discovery
abuse problem, see National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures,
80 F.R.D. 509, 522 (1979); Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Reform: The
Continuing Need for an Umpire, 31 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 543, 562 (1980); Note, supra, at 1045
& n.76; see also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 481, Rule 26
advisory committee note (rule 26(b)(1) amended to "encourage judges to be more aggressive
in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse").
' See Note, supra note 4, at 1035-36. Ordinarily, discovery is an extrajudicial endeavor,
since most requests do not entail court involvement. Id.; see infra notes 11-15. Additionally,
the federal rules provide few restrictions upon what and how much material may be discov-
ered. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. In fact, the rules appear to encourage "fish-
ing expeditions." Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 120 (1962); see
Note, supra note 4, at 1036 ("[i]ronically, [the] fundamental features of the discovery
rules-their breadth and reliance on party initiative-render them susceptible to abuse").
One of the principal mechanisms through which discovery must be controlled, there-
fore, is cooperation between attorneys themselves. Kaufman, supra, at 116. Since attorneys
are often paid on an hourly basis, however, there is "a lack of economic incentive to curtail
discovery." Pollack, supra note 4, at 223. There is, in addition, always a concern that some-
thing will be overlooked, and that the attorney will be charged with legal malpractice. Bra-
zil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of
Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 217, 244-45; Smith, The Concern Over
Discovery, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 51, 51 n.1 (1978). The result is that attorneys are torn between
their duty as an officer of the court to remain within reasonable bounds and their duty to
represent their clients zealously. Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and
Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253, 255-56
& n.25 (1978). See generally Kaufman, supra, at 120-25.
6 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26(b)(1) provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or
to the claim or defense of any other party .... " Id.
The discovery provisions were seen by many as the most innovative and drastic change
in federal civil practice caused by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., J. LANDERS
& J. MARTIN, CIvL PROCEDURE 560 (1981); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FED-
ERAL COURTS § 81, at 398 (3d ed. 1976). Discovery was to supplant detailed and comprehen-
19831
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the broad scope of this disclosure. Invariably, lawyers resort to the
Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylors for the rit-
ual citation of the concept that rule 26 is to be accorded "broad
and liberal treatment."' "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties," stated the Hickman Court, "is es-
sential to proper litigation."'10
In an effort to implement the broad mandate of rule 26, the
federal rules have placed at the disposal of attorneys an extensive
array of discovery tools. These include oral depositions," written
depositions, 2 interrogatories," s document requests under rule 3414
and requests for admissions. 5 The tools themselves are not only
numerous, but are also capable of almost infinite service. As the
sive pleading; it seeks to achieve the "fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). The discovery process has three
primary functions:
(1) To narrow the issues, in order that at the trial it may be necessary to produce
evidence only on a residue of matters that are found to be actually disputed and
controverted. (2) To obtain evidence for use at the trial. (3) To secure information
about the existence of evidence that may be used at trial ....
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 15 (1970). In addi-
tion, the drafters of the federal rules sought to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The replacement of rigid pleading rules
with liberal ones and the addition of discovery to replace the old pleadings' function "were
intended not only to eliminate the technical rigidity associated with previous practice, but
also to mitigate the 'sporting' quality of adversarial litigation." Note, supra note 4, at 1033
(footnotes omitted); see Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir.
1958).
8 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the Supreme Court limited the scope of discovery
by creating a privilege against forced disclosure of the opposing attorney's work product.
See id. at 510. "[T]he 'work product of the lawyer'" has been defined as "the result of his
use of his tongue, his pen, and his head, for his client ...... C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 82,
at 406.
1 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
10 Id. In explaining the purpose for liberal discovery rules, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the "procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be com-
pelled. . . thus reducing the possibility of surprise." Id. The Court added that the "fishing
expedition" is not necessarily an evil, even though it had been regarded as one in the past.
Id. Primarily, the mutuality of the opportunity to "fish" mitigates the dangers. Id. at 507
n.8; accord 4 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02[2], at 26-66 n.4 (2d ed. 1983).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) ("[a]ny party may take the testimony of any person, including a
party, by deposition upon oral examination").
12 FED. R. Cry. P. 31(a) (any party is permitted to "take the testimony of any person
...by deposition upon written questions").
11 FED. R. Cv. P. 33; see Flegal & Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 599, 604-06.
', FED. R. CIv. P. 34.
15 Id. 36. Requests for admission result in a narrowing of the issues and factual contro-
versies, since "any matter admitted is conclusively established." Id. 36(b).
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rule itself provides: "the frequency of use of these methods is not
limited." '16 It is not surprising that this power, although serving the
valuable goals of limiting and defining the issues for trial, has also
led to misuse, abuse and overuse, and to what is sometimes termed
the "scorched earth" approach to pretrial discovery. I"
The discovery largesse of rules 26 through 36 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is balanced by the penalties provision set
out in rule 37, which is described simply as "sanctions."18 In Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper,l" the Supreme Court strongly admon-
ished the lower federal courts that "Rule 37 sanctions must be ap-
plied diligently both 'to penalize those whose conduct may be
16 Id. 26(a).
17 Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders, 540 F. Supp. 706, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see Burger,
Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 95-96 (1976);
Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposal for Change,
31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1323-25 (1978). In addition to "fishing expeditions," excessive docu-
mentation, and overly extensive interrogatories, discovery abuse takes the form of document
production in a disorganized manner and in large quantities, forcing opposing counsel to
sort through mounds of paper. At other times, counsel may not respond at all to justified
requests. Underwood, supra note 4, at 659. Finally, overuse of discovery has been noted by
many as the most pressing form of abuse. E.g., Flegal & Umin, supra note 13, at 597; see D.
SEGAL, SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON DIscovERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT. ExPREssED DIssAT-
ISFACTION AND PROPOSED REFORMS 11 (1978).
In 1980, the federal rules were amended in order to deter misuse of the discovery pro-
cess and to reduce the costs of discovery. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 526, Rule 26(f) advisory committee note (1980). Justices Powell,
Stewart and Rehnquist dissented to the amendments, stating that "the changes... [fell]
short of those needed to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that are long overdue."
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 997-98 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting). Justice Powell emphasized that "[t]he present Rules... invite discovery of
such scope and duration that district judges often cannot keep the practice within reasona-
ble bounds." Id. at 999 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). He also cited a report of
the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association as "mak[ing] clear that the 'serious
and widespread abuse of discovery' will remain largely uncontrolled." Id. at 998 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Many commentators have expressed similar views regarding the insufficiency of
the amendments, particularly the absence of any change in the interrogatory procedure. See,
e.g., Flegal & Umin, supra note 13, at 600 & n.11.
1S FED. R. Civ. P. 37. The federal rules provide for various sanctions which are to be
imposed at the discretion of the trial court for a "failure to make or cooperate in discovery."
Id. The trial court may regard designated facts as established, disallow designated claims or
defenses, strike or dismiss pleadings, render a default judgment, or find the party in con-
tempt of court. Id. 37(b)(2)(A)-(D). In addition to or in place of any of these sanctions, the
judge may require the party disobeying the order or his attorney or both "to pay the reason-
able expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust." Id. 37(b)(2)(E). Attorney's fees and costs may similarly be granted to a party who is
forced to go to court to achieve compliance with discovery requests. Id. 37(a)(4).
19 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
1983]
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deemed to warrant such a sanction, and to deter those who might
be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.' "20
Although virtually all of the specific remedies enumerated in rule
37 to penalize and deter abusive conduct are directed at the party
rather than his attorney,21 the real focus of Roadway Express is on
attorney sanctions and not on the punishment of the client.22 Ap-
parently due to the Court's concern that the client should not be
made to suffer for conduct essentially within the lawyer's do-
main-the conduct of pretrial discovery-the courts are more fre-
20 Id. at 763-64 (quoting National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,
427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). In Roadway Express, the Court reviewed the powers of the fed-
eral courts to assess monetary penalties against attorneys. The Court integrated the "Ameri-
can Rule"-that attorney's fees are not available to the winning party-into title 28, section
1927 of the United States Code, holding that an award of costs against an attorney for
"multiplying the proceedings" may not include attorney's fees. 447 U.S. at 759-63.
In its discussion of rule 37, the Court stressed the importance of strict sanctioning of
both parties and attorneys who do not comply with the discovery rules or court orders per-
taining to discovery. Id. at 763-64. The Court directed the district court to act upon the
request for costs and attorney's fees caused by counsel's behavior, which had ultimately
resulted in the dismissal of the action. Id. at 764.
21 See supra note 18. An order which denies the party an opportunity to dispute certain
facts, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), or to put forth certain claims or defenses, id. 37(b)(2)(B),
or one which strikes a pleading or a portion of a pleading, id. 37(b)(2)(C), and especially a
dismissal or default judgment, id. 37(b)(2)(D), clearly has more of an adverse effect on the
attorney's client than on the attorney himself. The fact that sanctions will harm the client
for the "sins of his attorney" has been recognized as a cause of judicial reluctance to impose
sanctions. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALiF. L. REv. 264, 273
(1979). This concern has also been a relevant factor in considering the appropriate sanction
to be imposed. In Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657
F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982), the Seventh Circuit noted that
the grant of summary judgment is a burden which "fall[s] too heavily upon the parties," and
therefore the court reduced the harshness of the punishment. Id. at 904; cf. J.M. Clemin-
shaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338, 355 (D. Conn. 1981) (notwithstanding that rule
41(b) provides only for dismissal, money sanctions may be imposed if the violation is caused
by an attorney).
Despite the harsh punishment a party may suffer for his attorney's malfeasance, circuit
courts often affirm the imposition of even the strictest penalties, such as dismissal and de-
fault, as falling within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Barta v. Long, 670 F.2d 907,
910 (10th Cir. 1982); Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 391-92 (2d
Cir. 1981); Glukstad, Inc. v. Lineas Aereas Nacional-Chile, 656 F.2d 976, 979 (5th Cir. 1981);
Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958) (severe
sanctions, such as dismissal, are not invoked unless there is wilful refusal, bad faith or
fault). In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976),
the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action under rule 37. Id. at
643. The Court reviewed the imposition of the sanction under an "abuse of discretion" stan-
dard, and found that it was not an abuse for the trial judge to dismiss the action since the
attorneys showed bad faith and a "'callous disregard' of their responsibilities." Id.
2 See 447 U.S. at 766.
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quently following the direction of rule 37(a)(4) that, "[if the [dis-
covery] motion is granted, the court shall ... require ... the
attorney advising such conduct [which necessitated the motion] to
pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in ob-
taining the order, including attorney's fees .... In this rule lies
the basis for the more aggressive judicial control and supervision
which the Judicial Conference has urged and which has already in
fact come to characterize the decisions of the federal courts in the
wake of the 1980 Supreme Court opinion in Roadway Express.2
This increased emphasis on aggressive control impacts the ju-
diciary and, of course, the client. For lawyers actively engaged in
litigation in the federal courts, the emerging emphasis on punish-
ment and deterrence25 has practical consequences. 6 The district
courts in the Second Circuit, for example, following the directive of
Roadway Express, are imposing sanctions on attorneys with in-
creasing frequency.27 Not only are the penalties being imposed in
favor of prevailing adversaries, but they are also, in some cases,
being imposed in favor of the court itself,28 apparently on the the-
" FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Rule 37(a)(4) provides for the mandatory imposition of costs
and attorney's fees when an order to comply is granted unless the opposing party's noncom-
pliance with discovery requests can be "substantially justified." Id.
24 Batista, New Discipline in Old Game-Sanctions for Discovery Abuses, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 3; see, e.g., In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 638 (5th
Cir. 1981); Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981); Dependahl v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981).
" Underwood, supra note 4, at 662-63; Note, supra note 4, at 1044-54. In the final
analysis, courts rarely impose sanctions on attorneys or parties. Flegal & Umin, supra note
13, at 603. More recently, however, courts have begun to note the need to deter abuse of the
discovery process. In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that "the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions
provided by statute or rule must be available to the district court .... not merely to penal-
ize .... but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a
deterrent." Id. at 643; see Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Inmobiliaria Melia de
Puerto Rico, Inc., 543 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977).
' Batista, supra note 24, at 2, col. 2 (a penalty imposed upon an attorney "carries
substantial risks to the attorney's reputation").
" Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Carr, An Up-Date on Rule 37 Sanctions After Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Clubs, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 145, 153 (1980).
6 See J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338, 351-60 (D. Conn. 1981).
In Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1962), a fine levied against counsel,
payable to the court, was disallowed since there was no finding of contempt prior to assess-
ment of the penalty. Id. at 732. More recently, however, the Second Circuit, in In re Sutter,
543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976), affirmed the assessment of a fine against counsel, payable to
the court, for delaying commencement of trial. The fine was levied pursuant to a local rule
of the Eastern District of New York, id. at 1037, and as such, the Second Circuit declined to
follow the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Gamble, id. at 1037-38.
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ory that misuse of the discovery process in private litigation consti-
tutes some type of public harm.29 For lawyers, then, this increased
use of monetary sanctions necessitates, at a minimum, careful ex-
amination of discovery issues, for a discovery disagreement which
becomes a litigated dispute before a federal judge implicates the
sanction mechanisms of rule 37. It should be noted that in addition
to penalizing flagrantly abusive conduct, courts are imposing
money sanctions for negligence, inadvertance, and mere in-
eptitude.30
For the judiciary, financial penalties on lawyers also involve
sensitive issues. The recent amendments adopted by the Judicial
Conference appear to make the use of sanctions mandatory.3 1 At a
In Cleminshaw, the district court fined the attorney $150, payable to the court, in addi-
tion to costs and attorney's fees to the opposing party. 93 F.R.D. at 347. While it is feasible
that section 1927 of title 28 of the United States Code could have been the basis for the
court's authority to fine the attorney, the court did not base its holding on the statute. Id. at
353 n.12. In a detailed discussion of the propriety of the additional sanction, Judge
Cabranes drew an analogy to other sources of authority which have empowered courts to
impose penalties upon attorneys. These authorities, the court held, are drawn from the "in-
herent power to control the disposition of the case before it." Id. at 352 (citation omitted).
19 Cleminshaw, 93 F.R.D. at 360.
30 Underwood, supra note 4, at 661-62; see United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire
Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Marshall v. Segona, 621 F.2d 763, 768-
69 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissal is inappropriate when the disobedience is the result of neglect
or inability to comply).
'1 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 51 U.S.L.W. 4501, 4503 (U.S.
May 3, 1983) (Rule 26(g)). The amendments address three goals: "(1) reform of procedures
for the holding of pretrial conferences and for the scheduling and management of litigation
by district judges, (2) the control of discovery abuse, and (3) the need to conform the rules
to the jurisdictional provisions of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979." Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments, supra note 2, at 455. Rule 26(g) adds an attorney verification
provision similar to rule 11:
Every request for discovery, or response or objection ... shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record .... The signature of the attorney ... constitutes a
certification that he has read the request, response, or objection, and that ... it is
formed . . .(1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, (2)
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable
or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose either upon the person who made the certifi-
cation, or upon the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is
made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FOREWORD
minimum, as Judge Cabranes has recently stated, attorney sanc-
tions under existing rules are "an established technique" of "case
management" 32 -- a euphemism under which the judge ordered a
lawyer to pay money sanctions to his adversary and to the clerk of
the court.33
With respect to the public interest, attorney sanctions directly
involve interests that are important to the client. Any proposal for
change which promises both to increase the efficiency and fairness
of the litigation process, as well as to decrease its expense, has ob-
vious public appeal and benefit. Whether the increased application
of monetary sanctions on lawyers will advance these goals will
surely be the subject of much dialogue and debate.
In furthering this dialogue, the views of three distinguished
members of the legal community are presented in this Symposium.
Judge Abraham D. Sofaer will provide a view from the bench in a
comprehensive analysis of attorney discovery-abuse sanctions. Pe-
ter M. Fishbein, in an informal commentary, will discuss the re-
cently adopted discovery abuse sanctions from a litigator's per-
spective. Finally, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach will offer his remarks
on the new rules from the viewpoint of the corporate defense bar.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, Rule 26(g).
31 93 F.R.D. at 359; see supra note 4.
" See supra note 28.
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